A predominant feature governing human relationships and transactions in Bangladesh is the patron-client relationship. Because of wide disparities in wealth and power, the majority of people in Bangladesh are obliged to seek one or more patrons who provide access to land, income, employment, or political and physical protection. Such relationships form the basis for political and economic order at the village level, in turn feeding into a wider network of patronages that link up to power centers in Dhaka. Although not strictly identical, kinship relationships forge similar ties.
Patrons exert considerable social and political control on formal power structures, using their influence on public decision-making and services in order to reinforce their power base or to extract profits. These range from gaining access to preferential services, forgery of legal papers, nepotism in obtaining employment or securing business contracts. Opposition or non-compliance may result in intimidation or physical violence. Since patronages also extend their influence to law enforcement mechanisms, many abuses go unprosecuted. This reinforces the notion that personal loyalties are more important than the rule of law.
There is an extremely high incidence of loan default in the banking sector (17% in private banks and 39% in public banks) for example, with about 78% of defaulters using connections to get their loans approved. Most bad debts cannot be recovered. Democratic pluralism has also lead to the creation of a new kind of patronage. The leaders of the major political parties hold almost absolute power, with party members remaining extremely loyal to their leaders at the cost of accountability and responsiveness to their constituencies and grassroots party activists.
Corrupt practices such as misappropriation of party funds by senior party leaders therefore go unchallenged. Political competition has also managed to politicize the civil service. Parties award supporters with choice civil service positions in disregard to merit, and government initiatives can be channeled to promote the political interests of one or another party. Presidential Order No. 9 empowers the President to dismiss any civil servant at any time without justification and prevents any subsequent contestation in court, giving politics extraordinary power over bureaucracy.
Lack of transparency and accountability in public institutions also contribute to conditions facilitating corruption. The Official Secrets Act of 1923 and Bangladesh Service Rules forbid the release of government information unless officially authorized. This culture of secrecy gives civil servants highly discretionary powers in business operations as well as making public scrutiny much more difficult. Since work procedures are complex and multilayered, there are multiple windows for abuse.
Poor motivation, low salaries (pay of senior officers has eroded by around 70% since 1969 and the remuneration of junior staff has halved in real terms) and lack of career advancement opportunities also make rent-seeking an easy means to improve life for many civil servants. About 30% of public expenditure and up to 80% of foreign-assisted public expenditure must go through a procurement process. However, there is no government framework which controls procurement procedures, and it is estimated that 10-15% of public procurement is subject to corruption.
Revenue losses from corruption and inefficiencies in the customs and income tax departments are estimated to exceed 5% of GDP. Lack of independent and effective corruption control mechanisms dilute accountability. Audits are often out-dated and there are no follow-up mechanisms that punish questionable actions. Law enforcement agencies such as the police are perceived as among the worst offenders. The courts are overloaded with pending cases and may take years to try abusers, as well as being open to corruption.
The independence of the judiciary is also questionable, since the separation of the Executive and the Judiciary is yet to take place, despite its provision under the Constitution and a High Court Order mandating the separation. The Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption is generally considered to be itself corrupt and its position under the Prime Minister’s Office leads many to view it more as a tool to intimidate political opponents, particularly in the present highly confrontational political climate. 1. 2. Measures taken to Combat Corruption
Bangladesh has had 17 public administration reform commissions in the last 30 years, none of which have had a lasting impact. In June 2000 the most recent Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) published 125 recommendations with the help of UNDP. Of these, 5 are for anti-corruption: 1. Reduction or elimination of administrative discretion to institute a more transparent and competitive bureaucratic service; 2. Appointment of an Ombudsman; 3. Establishment of a more independent Anti-Corruption Commission; 4. Establishment of a Criminal Justice Commission to deal with corruption in the police force; and 5.
Regulation of political funding. As in the case of previous PARCs, the present administration has yet to take substantive measures adopting the recommendations, although it is now reviewing the reports of all past PARCs and itemizing the recommendations for actions which have not been taken. Slowness in adopting public reform measures may be attributed to the reluctance of most politicians and bureaucrats to institute changes that may undermine the current power structure, although the weakness of the public institutions in carrying out any kind of action has also been blamed.
As mentioned in Section 1. 1, anti-corruption measures initiated by the Government are viewed by the public with more suspicion than welcomed. However, Bangladesh is making gradual progress in some reform initiatives and these may act as potential catalysts to anti-corruption, albeit in the future. Bangladesh is conscious that its nascence comes from a strong political will for democracy, made at the cost of the lives of many of its people.
With the resumption of democracy in 1990 and the introduction of the caretaker system, the past three national elections have seen increasing voter turnout (particularly among women), better informed and educated voters, and less violence. It is conceivable that the pressures civil society leveraged in bringing about democracy can again be tapped as democracy deepens and the public become more aware of their rights and the importance of governance reform. The press continues to play an important role in revealing and condemning corruption cases.
Some NGOs, such as the Bangladesh Chapter of Transparency International (TIB), News Network and Amnesty International have become crucial players, as they investigate and gather information that is used to raise public awareness. TIB also supports what it calls “islands of honesty”—judges, civil servants and private business who uphold the rule of law, oppose corruption, and recognize the importance of integrity and public welfare. These “islands” can act as powerful change agents, raising public awareness and organizing a more vocal and visible critic to corruption.
The Parliament is receiving increasing visibility and has potential to take on its oversight functions as opposition MPs return to participate and some Standing Committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee, become more important in scrutinizing the Ministries and Departments. Reforms in local government resulted in elections of local government officials in 1997 and 1999, 2002 and 2003. Decentralization continues to be pushed by many as a way to break the monopolies of government institutions and MPs on public resources, increasing possibilities for greater government responsiveness and performance towards its true beneficiaries.
All of the above receive support from ODA, as further elaborated in Section 2. In 2002, the army was called out in support of civil authority because it became apparent—including at the highest levels—which the law and order situation was deteriorating. Although Operation Clean Heart has been questioned for human rights abuses and cannot be welcomed full-heartedly as a positive development, it does reveal the increasing frustration in some circles to the current situation within the country and the growing pressures for change. 2. The Role of Donors in Fighting Corruption 2. 1.
The Role of UNDP and its Development Partners in Anti-Corruption Bangladesh has achieved impressive development outcomes compared to many other low income countries. This is particularly remarkable given the extremely difficult circumstances it has faced: a brutal civil war, repeated major natural disasters and military dictatorships. GDP has grown 4-5% annually over the past 20 years, fertility has been halved, life expectancy has grown by 10-15 years and food production has increased from a situation of chronic shortages to almost self-sufficiency, despite the rapid increase in population.
However, 40% of the population still lives below the poverty line. Donors place the current state of governance as one of the main obstacles hampering higher growth in Bangladesh and the reduction of absolute poverty, leading to a series of governance reports sponsored by donors such as the World Bank, UNDP and ADB. However, there have been few previous occasions to engage the Government in direct dialogue on corruption, notably due to sensitivity that it encroaches on sovereign territory.
When a detailed World Bank draft study “Corruption in Bangladesh: Costs and Cures” was released in March 2000, the Government was not pleased and did its best to discredit the study. Within this context, donors’ support in governance projects have so far targeted institutions or activities which are strategic in increasing transparency and accountability, but without the anti-corruption label. For example, in addition to the PARC project mentioned in section 1. , UNDP is also providing assistance to the Parliament to strengthen their financial oversight functions as a means to increase scrutiny of public expenditures. Its project with the Comptroller and Auditor General introduced performance audits, an international audit standards manual, the separation of audits and accounts (effected in July 2001) and strengthening linkages to the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament.
Other UNDP-financed governance projects include provision of training to local officials and institutional strengthening for local governments; assistance to develop legislation for an independent Human Rights Commission and advocate for its eventual inception; and support to the National Election Commission and national elections in October 2001 (of particular interest is work to strengthen “political” transparency by computerizing the voter roll so that voters can obtain their registration numbers prior to the election without having to refer to any particular party).
A new UNDP project currently under formulation will provide support to police reform. Other relevant donor-supported projects include the Public Sector Modernization Project (World Bank with other donors) to support the implementation of the PARC report; World Bank’s project to standardize public sector procurement procedures; DFID’s support to improve budgeting, accounting and expenditure control in the public sector; UNDP/DFID/Netherlands support to the Comptroller and Auditor General; and an IDA credit in legal and judiciary reform.
One of UNDP’s most notable achievements in anti-corruption has been its initiatives in advocacy and donor coordination. It has provided a chance to deliver key messages with “one voice”, hopefully having a greater impact than ad hoc delivery of separate “laundry lists” by various donors.
As the chair of the Local Consultative Group (LCG) sub-group in governance, UNDP sponsored activities such as tracking progress of Government commitments on governance following the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) and establishing and facilitating the work of complementary Working groups on human rights, justice, decentralization, and financial management reform.
In the face of the Government’s reluctance to enter into substantive discussions on corruption, and increasing concerns among donors on how to safeguard transparency and accountability within their aid activities in Bangladesh, UNDP suggested to the LCG in Autumn 2001 that donors concentrate on this issue in the one area where the Government cannot object of “foreign interference”–corruption in foreign aid.
As a result, UNDP carried out an ODA Transparency and Accountability Survey in 2002 (with advice from World Bank, ADB and DFID), collecting and collating donors’ concerns to identify common concerns and establish best practices in areas such as procurement, training (study tours abroad), audit and recruitment. The results were then distributed in a report (“Transparency and Accountability in Foreign Aid in Bangladesh”) and also transmitted to the Government, facilitating an entry point for discussions.
The Government committed to setting up joint donor/Government working groups to discuss how to improve and harmonize procedures in these areas. These working groups commenced their work in early 2003 and their initial reports and recommendations will be presented at the Bangladesh Development Forum to be held in Dhaka in mid-May. Donor coordination has also moved to stronger cooperation in the implementation of projects. A part of UNDP’s assistance to CAG was to strengthen CAG’s cell for liaison with the Parliament and its committees.
However, since the Committees were only formed in early May of this year and the CAG project has been terminated in the meantime, this linkage will now be encouraged through partnership with DFID (UK) who co-finances the Parliament project with UNDP and also supports a financial management project (mentioned above), that includes the CAG. Similarly, the DFID/Netherlands FMR project continues much of the groundwork laid by UNDP’s project for CAG. They reinforce the importance of stronger partnerships and donor liaison in effecting comprehensive and longer-term reform. . 2. Gathering Momentum: Recent Developments in Donor-supported Anti-Corruption The past two years of extensive donor dialogue and coordination in anti-corruption has built concerted support and donors now feel that they can publicly refer to corruption. UNDP, also in its role of chair to the LCG Governance sub-group took the initiative to coordinate a donor meeting specific to Anti-Corruption initiatives prior to the Bangladesh Development Forum (mentioned above). The latter included anti-corruption as a key concern and priority to be addressed.
The World Bank is currently negotiating a Development Support Credit providing legislation of an independent Anti-Corruption Commission (IACC) as a condition to its approval. ADB is currently negotiating with the Government a project providing support in drafting a bill and the operationalization of the IACC. USAID is proposing to organize a meeting of a number of former heads of IACCs, and DFID provided a grant to TIB for a comprehensive programme and is now considering support for the ADB project.
It may be no coincidence that just last week the Cabinet has agreed in principle to set up an independent Anti-Corruption Commission (IACC). Although the bill is pending finalisation by the Ministry of Law, the IACC will normally be composed of a three-member body headed by a chairman. The members will be appointed by the President from a panel prepared by a scrutiny committee comprised of two Supreme Court judges, the CAG, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and two other persons nominated by the President.
A Bureau of Anti-Corruption will be under the Commission to investigate or sue any incidences of mismanagement by public officials. The IACC will be financially independent, with the power to investigate any allegations without prior Government approval. Although it would be dangerous to accord too much credit to the outsiders, recent positive developments for anti-corruption in Bangladesh may well owe much to the efforts of donors, NGOs such as TIB, and the increase in global scrutiny put upon Bangladesh by TI’s global corruption index. 2. 3.
Facing Corruption: The Experience of UNDP Bangladesh When UNDP Bangladesh started a comprehensive reprofiling of its programme portfolio and reform of its business operations in 2000, anti-corruption was not the ultimate objective. UNDP’s actual goal was to increase programme impact and to streamline its administration to maximize efficiency. However, corruption was perceived as one of the factors seriously affecting the effectiveness of its initiatives. Moreover, for an office seeking to promote its role as a forerunner in the support for good governance, it could not permit corruption and governance malpractices plaguing its activities.
Close inspection of project finances revealed a wide range of abuses: unjustified payment of salary increases or other remuneration to project staff; misuse of project equipment including vehicles; nepotism in the recruitment of project staff (often with no qualifications for the required TOR); organization of non-strategic study tours involving participants who were not relevant to project activities and objectives; and carrying out of procurement and sub-contracts that were either not specified under the project, did not produce any end-results, or were awarded unjustifiably to those connected to project/counterpart government officials.
A series of management actions were taken to immediately stop major abuses. This involved long, and often very sensitive negotiations with senior officials at project counterpart ministries and the Economic Relations Division (ERD) in the Ministry of Finance, UNDP’s main government counterpart. Government support and consent was obtained before UNDP launched any remedial actions.
There is a strong correlation between the introduction of NEX and the dramatic increase in audit observations, although it would be impossible to draw direct linkages between the audits and mismanagement, particularly since the rise in audit observations can also be attributed to other reasons such as the increase in irrelevant and non-UNDP specific observations. Between 1990-1994, NEX audit observations ranged between 10-20. In 1995, the first year of full NEX implementation, it jumped to 32. The number of observations increased to 90 in 1997 and has never been lower than 100 in the past five years.
There is no question that NEX is an important modality promoting Government ownership and sustainability of UNDP programmes. However, there was a strong feeling in UNDP Bangladesh that incidences of misuse may have been limited if NEX had been introduced with the appropriate accountable and transparent work procedures as well as a more comprehensive support to government institutions. UNDP organized four main initiatives aimed at strengthening counterpart government institutions in NEX management and introducing tools to facilitate in-house NEX monitoring as follows:
• Support to Government mplementing agencies through the recruitment of two accountancy firms: The office recruited two local accountancy firms to carry out visits to all NEX projects in order to ascertain project compliance with NEX financial and accounting rules and procedures. Where impediments were identified for smooth operations, the firms advised the projects on ways and means to resolve problems, including on-the-job training on NEX procedures and regulations. A first comprehensive round of visits took place in November/December 2002 followed by a second round in December 2000/January 2001. NEX Training and Revision of the Manual: Consequently, the office organized a series of NEX workshops to develop management capacities of NPDs and project counterparts. Based on the findings of independent audits, the accountancy firms (mentioned above) and the workshops, the NEX Manual was revised extensively. Existing procedures were simplified, and new sections were added such as NEX capacity management; alternative execution modalities; project termination clauses (in the event of non-performance or problematic performance) and result-based management.
The revised NEX manual was finalized and submitted to the Government for review and formal approval in December 2002. • Tighter Monitoring and Proactive Management: Closer scrutiny and monitoring enabled the office to gain a better understanding of the relative state of each project, thereby allowing it to take a series of management actions to address problems which could not be resolved by training or administrative support. For example, the office suspended financial quarterly advances to several projects in order to bring several cases of NEX abuses to an end.
In five separate cases, the office was obliged to use Article XI of the SBAA giving it the right to suspend and ultimately terminate “problem” projects unless remedial actions were taken. At UNDP’s request, the Government agreed to remove the National Project Directors from five projects. A desk review of the CVs of 137 project staff from one project revealed close to 70 cases of fraud and falsified diplomas and the contracts of non-performing staff were not renewed.
At the same time, a total of 14 project evaluations were carried out between 2001 and 2002, comprising almost 90% of UNDP resources in Bangladesh. Thematic evaluations for UNDP microcredit components and community empowerment projects and several ad hoc personnel and financial audits were also carried out. The main objective was to evaluate projects in light of their policy significance, to identify factors hindering smooth implementation and identify solutions, such as project reformulation or management support.
As a result UNDP, with the Government concurrence, closed nine non-performing projects for which no realistic resolutions were found. Approximately $25 million was returned to TRAC for the formulation of new projects. Where appropriate, projects were reformulated to remove implementation obstacles and strengthen their policy impact. • Project Management Performance Annual Scorecard: An annual project scorecard has been developed and has been introduced by the office after consultation with the Ministry of Finance.
The scorecards “grade” the management performance of each project using criteria comprised from four components: i) timeliness of project implementation according to the work plan; ii) quality of monitoring, reporting and evaluation; iii) quality of resource management; and iv) quality of financial management. The scorecard facilitates the office’s monitoring of NEX projects by ensuring periodic assessment along important management parameters in an easy-to-prepare and easy-to-access format. A scorecard has been prepared by the POs in December 2001 and 2002 and is being prepared as part of the preparation for annual TPRs.
A short version of the scorecard is also completed prior to the quarterly advances. All parties have agreed that from now on, NEX will not be adopted unconditionally on an across the board basis, but to conduct a preliminary assessment of the concerned executive unit for each new project. “NEX should be used only where adequate technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacity exists, or where reasonable, clearly identifiable and time-bound support by the project or CO will suffice to create the capacity…. he government remains committed to national execution as a means to increase ownership and build capacity, it is unclear whether NEX should embrace all aspects of project management and input mobilization or limit itself to priority setting, policy making, resource allocations and monitoring. ” (OAPR Audit Report, June 2002) Based on the findings of this NEX capacity assessment, a decision will be made to execute the project through full NEX, a combination of NEX and UN execution, or full UN execution.
The UNDP office expects that the graduated use of NEX, combined with activities in institutional strengthening and capacity building will eventually enable a re-introduction of full NEX. An UNDP-supported project strengthening the capacity of the Foreign-Assisted Projects Audit Directorate of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s office will be complimented by periodic pre-audits carried out by private auditors to provide more credible deterrents to potential misuse/mismanagement of project resources. Efforts at streamlining internal management were carried out in parallel to the above NEX-strengthening efforts.
In July 2001, the office constituted several taskforces composed of the senior management, ARRs and programme officers from both administration and programme to review work procedures and guidelines governing key management actions. Recommendations on ways to simplify them were considered and introduced immediately. A notable innovation has been the introduction of e-management in the form of OfficeNet, an Internet-based management tool (under development since May 2002 and under use since September).
The OfficeNet has multiple purposes. At its simplest level, it e-files all incoming and outgoing correspondence so that at any given time, staff can access project information either through the “hard” files or through OfficeNet. It also serves as a database for important information such as the consultant roster and project briefs. More importantly, task integrators allow interested managers, officers and/or project implementing agencies to track the status of key tasks in project and budget revisions, procurement, recruitment, etc. o that follow-up can be done at the right stage of the process and identify bottlenecks. Since information such as budget revisions and expenditures, study tours and procurement can only be entered by the responsible persons and is available immediately through OfficeNet, it provides a transparent, easy, and fast project tracking and management system. Throughout the exercise, the UNDP management tried to emphasize the value of professional transparency and the gains to be made by efficiency gains so that work procedure simplification would also be accompanied with shifts in attitude.
A preliminary feedback on improvements in UNDP’s programme and in its internal management is the OAPR audit, which rated the office’s performance satisfactory for the period 1 January 2001 to 31 March 2002, the first time in over the past 10 years. Since external management audits in the 1990s have consistently rated the office as either marginally deficient (1993 and 1996) or deficient (1995, 1999 and 2001), this is considered a very positive outcome.
There are signs that all major abuses in its programme have been stopped and the office has not been able to detect evidences of any new cases. 3. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 3. 1. Significance at a National Level in Fighting Corruption Bangladesh’s activities in anti-corruption are only at a preliminary stage. It would be too premature to gauge how lasting an impact the donors can have in influencing the Government to affect reforms, or to contemplate what specific actions the Government may take (if it does act).
That the donors have been finally able to convince the Government, both through advocacy and pressure, to set aside its sensitivity curtain and treat corruption in a more open manner is in itself a considerable accomplishment. In the Aid Governance process, dialogue is a key first step that allows movement from denial to awareness and then to action. It comes as the culmination of more than two years of efforts by all donors to present a united front.
Factors to its success include committed leadership in both LCG and UNDP and UNDP’s investment of considerable human resource time and efforts towards its success. UNDP ensured the participation of almost all the donors active in Bangladesh for the ODA survey, thereby lending it credibility, follow-up through phone conversations and small focus group meetings served to clarify issues; common issues were identified so that a joint approach could be made to the Government; and constant networking enabling all donors to constantly be on the same wave length.
Identifying and working with potential change agents within the Government (i. e. counterpart institutions in many of the ODA governance projects) furthered the process. The fact that the donors have chosen to look at anti-corruption, at least initially, through accountable and transparent work practices rather than more contentious political or social causes also may have helped in securing the Government’s acceptance. It would now be a challenge for all donors to maintain the current level of cooperation and keep the momentum going.
ODA-support to crucial anti-corruption programmes once the Government intentions are clearer will also be key. Though Government sensitivity might still become an issue, strategic selection of governance programmes that strengthen transparency and accountability, support to institutions (both public and private), which have the potential or already do support anti-corruption are all areas where donors intend to continue long-term work, with or without reference to anti-corruption.
The vital role of Transparency International, must also be noted. When its corruption index was released in June 2001 ranking Bangladesh at the top for the first time, and again in 2002, it did highlight the severity of corruption in Bangladesh, convincing donor capitals and aid agency headquarters to take stronger and proactive measures. Apart from the introduction of good management practices, many donors and local champions of anti-corruption see attitude change as the next step.
Enhancing political will and ethical standards and mobilizing public support is needed if anti-corruption is to have any far-reaching impact or long-term success, eventually touching upon the root causes of corruption. The role of the outsider becomes particularly important in this area—outsiders like ODA donors, NGOs, the private sector and the public—to leverage from the outside reforms needed within. 3. 2. Impact and Sustainability of Results within UNDP UNDP’s success playing a key role in donor advocacy/coordination is partly due to its in-house look at corruption and its successful outcome.
There may be some “lessons learned” that can extend to other UNDP Country Offices who are involved in anti-corruption. UNDP is placed in a very peculiar position. The success of UNDP’s programme is largely determined by its relationship with its counterpart, the Government. Although it cannot afford to put itself in an adversarial context, professional commitment to good governance obliges it to detect and point out when it notes examples of “bad” governance.
By putting itself “on the block”, conducting a critical analysis of its own work before criticizing the Government, the UNDP office in Bangladesh has been able to demonstrate its commitment to governance, and prove that strong political will and appropriate management tools are effective in minimizing corruption. In light of overall pessimism in many who view Bangladesh’s corruption as too deeply rooted in the power structure and intrinsic to its business practices, it came as a heartening example.
It served to gain UNDP renewed confidence from its development partners, giving it the credibility to pursue wider areas of anti-corruption. That UNDP started in a small “sector (i. e. UNDP-funded projects)”, may have been construed as non-threatening and therefore de-sensitize many political connotations. Secondly, the use of non-political solutions such as simplification of work procedures and the introduction of e-management also goes a long way. E-management can be an attractive tool since ICT is a la mode as a development key word.
It can assume the face of a traditional technology transfer, is apolitical and anonymous, and yet has the potential to further significant efficiency gains if designed and used properly. Several key Government counterparts in Bangladesh have expressed an interest in adapting OfficeNet to streamlining their bureaucracy, and have requested UNDP’s assistance in supporting such a transformational exercise in their respective institutions. The Ministry of Environment has volunteered to pilot test such a system. Similar requests have been received from several UN agencies, including UNICEF, FAO and WFP.
A sustained fight to combat corruption is a very time-consuming and painful process for all concerned and requires substantial amounts of investments in technical and human resources. In the global UNDP context where many country offices face increasing workloads per staff, it requires considerable prior commitment, professional capacity and the strategic use of resources to obtain any real impact. Strategic overview over a longer-time frame also helps to identify approaches which UNDP can take in the immediate future to act as building blocks leading to eventual attainment of long-term goals.
It would be rather naive to assume that all corruption has been erased from UNDP work as there are possibilities that new attempts are now driven underground or conducted in subtler and harder to detect methods. It would also be an open question whether UNDP’s success came because it is an outsider, or despite it. Since NEX strengthening and development of OfficeNet are still on-going, it would take 2-3 years or more in order to realistically assess sustainability and the lasting impact of its current activities.
A major internal challenge for UNDP Bangladesh would be to continue efforts to institutionalize its new work processes and attitudes and to constantly monitor its progress so that there is no reverting back to previous practices. Tacit support received from several Government counterparts in UNDP’s efforts also indicate that quite a few Bangladeshi civil servants do oppose corruption and although they themselves may not be in a position to launch their own initiatives, will aid those who do.
The courage of Bangladeshi counterpart officers and of UNDP national staff in surmounting their own circumstances to demonstrate their integrity was particularly encouraging and instrumental in success. The Government’s overall toleration of UNDP’s exercise, despite obvious threats to material gains by several in their ranks, may also be some indication that anti-corruption is reaching a new acceptance level in Bangladesh.