Abstract This paper investigates the significance of the triple responsibilities under the responsibility to protect and determines their respective order of significance.
To this end, the main research question is: What is the role of each of the triple responsibilities under the responsibility to protect? An incidental research question arises and that question is: Is one responsibility more important than the others, or are they equally important?The responsibility to protect is predicated on the concept that co-operation among the international community of nations fosters global peace. This concept is intricately tied to the theory that peace can only be obtained by preventing and reacting to crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.[1] Equally as important, is the responsibility to rebuild in the aftermath of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.[2] Although each of the triple responsibilities fall one behind the other, they are so intricately tied that they are indistinguishable. For instance, if the international community fails in its attempt to prevent human suffering, they have a residual duty to react to it and in the aftermath of human suffering the responsibility to rebuild continues. In this sense, the triple responsibilities under the duty to protect, cannot be severed. This paper examines the ambit of the responsibility to protect and emphasises that the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild within this context, are each pivotal parts of the general duty to protect.
While each responsibility is important on its own, they are co-dependent in the sense that each duty necessarily involves the others. The responsibility to prevent and react enforces the duty to protect and the responsibility to rebuild has the capacity to draw attention to the cost and consequences of failing to prevent and react to crimes against humanity and human rights atrocities. It will be argued that these costs and consequences fortify the duties to react and prevent, so that each of the triple responsibilities are co-dependent and intricately tied together. By evaluating each of the triple responsibilities within the parameters of the responsibility to protect, it will become clear that each element falls back on and exemplifies the others.Table of ContentsAbstract..
…
….
…….
…
……
…..
…
…
…
…..
…….
…
…
……
…
…..
…..
…..
……
……..
…
……..
2Introduction……..
……
…
……..
…
……
……
……..
……
……
…….
……..
…….
…….
…..
……5The Responsibility to Prevent..
…
…..
…..
…
……
…….
….
…..
…..
…
…
…….
……
….
…
.7The Responsibility to React…….
…….
……..
….
…
…….
…..
….
……..
……
……..
……
.11The Responsibility to Rebuild…..
…….
…..
……
…
….
….
…..
…
……
…….
……
…….
.17Conclusion…..
….
……..
…..
……
….
…
…….
…….
……
……
……..
……
…
…
….
…..
……
…31Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………….35IntroductionThe framework for the Responsibility to Protect was adapted by the United Nations following a report by the same name published in 2001 by the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty. (ICISS)[3] Ultimately, the ICISS was responding to comments made by Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General in his challenge to the international community to adapt a workable agenda for responding to humanitarian crises, especially in circumstances where there is tension between humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.[4] A growing concern among UN member states about the unpredictable ad hoc approach to humanitarian crises paved the way for the new cluster approach envisaged within the ambit of the Responsibility to Protect.[5] The ICISS formulated a framework by which the international community could reconcile those tensions when ascertaining what actions are appropriate against other states, specifically, the use of military action when citizens are subjected to serious harm.[6] The ICISS’s primary goal was to reconcile the tension between concepts of sovereignty and the duty to forego those concepts to protect citizens in instances where the loss of life or the risk to loss of life is particularly large. However, the ICISS went a bit further by extending to the international community a general duty to prevent large scale loss of life together with a duty to respond when there is a risk of loss and to rebuild in the aftermath of conflict. In mapping out the Responsibility to Protect the ICISS said that:“What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them.”[7] The ICISS’s framework for the Responsibility to Protect was adapted by the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit.[8] Essentially, the Responsibility to protect introduces a new concept of sovereignty which imposes a positive and collective duty on individual states to protect “populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crime against humanity.”[9] In the words of the ICISS, the responsibility to protect confers upon states a duty to make provision for “life-supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk.”[10] In other words, states not only have a duty to protect their own populations but, they also have a duty to protect the international community. To this end the Responsibility to Protect encapsulates three specific objectives, the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. In order to understand the significance of each of these responsibilities individually and as co-dependents, it is necessary to examine the ambit of each of the responsibilities.The Responsibility to Prevent The ICISS’s contention that the responsibility to prevent is the most important duty within the ambit of the general duty to protect[11] comes as no surprise. The UN has always been committed to preventing conflict and maintaining global peace.[12] The Preamble to the UN Charter itself speaks to “saving future generations…from the scourge of war.”[13] In fact, as early as 1955, the UN General Assembly identified the UN’s primary function as one of preventing and resolving conflicts.[14] The concept of prevention however, gained new momentum in 1997 at the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict when it was acknowledged that a concerted effort to prevent conflict would cost substantially less than it would cost to intervene and rebuild.[15] Despite the Carnegie Commission’s call for structured prevention, the UN’s prevention strategies was ad hoc, based primarily on diplomatic approaches and crisis management via the auspices of institutions and organizations emanating from the UN. None of these organizations have implemented any form of strategic conflict prevention. As a result academics and social scientists have often commented that the UN’s conflict prevention strategy is “preached more often that it is practiced.”[16] Annan responded to criticism of this kind by adopting measures that were calculated to institutionalize conflict prevention and bolster the UN’s ability to prevent conflict. As a result, the UN Development Programme published its plans to emphasise conflict prevention and to allocate funds specifically for the purpose of instituting preventative steps for preserving peace.[17] This announcement was followed by Annan’s 2001 report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict.[18] This report was followed by Security Council Resolution 1366 on August 30th, 2001. Ultimately, Resolution 1366 restated the significance of conflict prevention by the UN and made provision for the creation of regional conflict prevention and a commitment to deploy all that was necessary and appropriate to the cause of preventing conflict.[19] The Resolution was in turn followed by the ICISS’s framework for the Responsibility to Protect. The duty to prevent has a long history and legal basis within the ambit of international law, particularly where it relates to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.[20] For instance the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1952 requires that states not only prevent but punish acts of genocide[21] as well as conspiracies to commit genocide, procurement to genocide, attempted genocide and complicity with respect to genocide.[22] Likewise crimes against humanity have been described and defined by tribunals and the International Criminal Courts from time to time.[23] While ethnic cleansing is not directly defined it can be interpreted to fall under the umbrella of crimes against humanity and genocide.[24]It is within this legal regime that each of the elements of the responsibility to protect fall. The responsibility to prevent, respond and rebuild must therefore be interpreted within the parameters of international criminal law. According to the ICISS, the responsibility to prevent:“… is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.”[25]The ICISS cautions however, that both the responsibility to prevent and to react requires the use of “less intrusive measures being considered” prior to the application of “more coercive and intrusive” measures.[26] The responsibility to prevent adheres to the concept that in satisfying the responsibility to protect, the international community is fully committed to preventing the escalation of conflicts and as such minimizing the risk of possible wide-scale atrocities. The idea is to promote an initiative that helps with the understanding and responding to the root causes of conflicts that have the potential to place populations at risk.[27] The ICISS also endeavours to ensure a more effective utilization of preventative steps. To this end, the ICISS advocates for a more reliable and structured early cautionary system rather than the current ad hoc system which is primarily commandeered by disconnected groups such as the UN, national government departments, regional organizations and NGOs. The ICISS recognizes and acknowledges that conflict is typically quite complex to the extent that it generally has several root causes. It therefore follows that the ICISS advocates for a wide preventative approach that is predicated on the protection and promotion of human rights, minority rights and at the same time focusing on economic, military, political and social elements that are connected to the conflict and that can possibly give way to human atrocities. [28] As the ICISS notes:“What is necessary is for the international community to change its basic mindset from a ‘culture of reaction’ to that of a ‘culture of prevention.’”[29] Despite the ICISS’s comment that the responsibility to prevent is the most important of the triple responsibilities under the responsibility to protect, the remainder of this paper will demonstrate that each responsibility is equally important. The fact remains, the responsibility to prevent would be entirely counterproductive in the absence of the responsibility to react which in turn would have little significance in the absence of the responsibility to rebuild. In other words, the responsibility to react reinforces the responsibility to prevent. Likewise the responsibility to rebuild, reinforces both the responsibility to prevent and react. By virtue of the existence of the responsibilities to react and rebuild, international communities are forced to contemplate the consequences of failing to prevent.The Responsibility to React The responsibility to react applies in situations where there is a dire need for protection of human rights and dignity.[30] As Luck explains the responsibility to react will be invoked in circumstances where preventative measures fail, or the effected state is either unable or unwilling to contain the crisis. Reactionary measures may include coercion in the form of political moves, judicial intervention and only in extraordinary circumstances, military recourse.[31] Just as the responsibility to prevent can be tied to pre-existing legal duties such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, so too can the responsibility to react. Upon even a broad interpretation of the Genocide Convention, the international community had a residual duty to react to genocide.[32] Again, like the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, places some restraints on the concept of national sovereignty. Even more so, encapsulated in both responsibilities is a reliance on the age old doctrine of just war. The ICISS deems that the responsibility to react with military intervention can only be justified within the threshold of just war.[33] The just cause threshold for the purpose of protection of an at risk population requires that there is grave and irreparable harm or at the very least irreparable harm is likely. The harm or perceived harm is required to be of the following type:· Wide scale loss of life, either in actuality or imminently. Whether or not the loss of life is guided by genocidal intentions or not, the wide scale loss of life much be either the product of state action, neglect or incapacity or a failure within the state; or· Ethnic cleansing on a wide scale, whether actual or anticipated and can be conducted by actual killing, expulsion, terrorism or rape.[34]In an address to the American Society of International Law in April 2004, Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group and Co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty said:“The threshold criteria articulated are wide enough to cover not only the deliberate perpetration of horrors such as occurred, or were anticipated, in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo, but situations as well of state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation and/or civil war (as in Somalia). Also potentially covered would be overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, which are not in themselves man-made, but where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.”[35] In reacting with the right intention, the reaction must be such that the main motivation for intervention, must be for the specific purpose of putting an end to the “human suffering.”[36] Evans maintains that one way of ensuring that the motivation for intervention is for the sole purpose of ending human suffering is to initiate multi-party reaction rather than single state reaction.[37] Another means of ensuring the appropriate motivation for the intervention is to ascertain whether or not the intervention is indorsed by those persons for whom the intervention is said to benefit. Yet, another means of ascertaining the appropriate motivation for the intervention is determining the extent to which the opinion of states in the locality have been considered and whether or not these regions lend support to the effort.[38] Belloni explains that “complete disinterestedness” is unrealistic. Complete disinterestedness is defined as a lack of “self-interest” altogether. [39] The fact is, international relations by its very nature is fraught by a tendency for actors to have mixed agendas and mixed motives. [40] Moreover, the mere fact that the intervening state is putting its own funds and citizens at risk justifies some measure of self-interest.[41] The last resort requirement with respect to the responsibility to react by recourse to military action can only arise in instances where all peaceful and non-military efforts have been exhausted. Put another way, when all reasonable measures fail to prevent human suffering, the responsibility to react becomes a number one priority. This in and of itself speaks to the interplay between the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react. As will be demonstrated later on, the responsibility to rebuild comes into play with equal importance as well. Evans puts the first two responsibilities in their proper perspective. He explains that the last resort criteria does not actually require that each and every possible peaceful attempt has been tried and essentially inconsequential. In most cases time will not allow for such an exercise to take place. What will inevitably suffice is evidence that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that, given the situation and the surrounding facts and circumstances, if peaceful and alternative means had been attempted they would have been doomed for failure.[42] Essentially, the responsibility to prevent may not even be an option in some cases. In such circumstances the responsibility to react becomes a priority. In the event reaction calls for military intervention, the extent to which military action is used must be proportional to protection of human beings.[43] In other words, the military action taken is required to correspond with the purpose for which it is used and must be consistent with the crisis it is responding to. Account must also be taken of the target’s political system so that the military intervention does not, as far as it is possible to do so, effect the political system beyond what is necessary to achieve the underlying goal of the intervention.[44] Prior to reacting with military action, there must be reasonable prospects of success in averting the human suffering. This essentially means that the consequences of the military action should not likely upstage the consequences of not taking action.[45] In the final analysis, military action can only be justified if it is entirely possible or likely that it will succeed and not run the risk of creating greater atrocities or problems. Finally, military reaction is not justifiable if the intervening state does not have the right authority.[46] The authority may and should come from the UN, if the ad hoc system of prevention is to be avoided. However, the UN is not always willing to lend authority to military intervention. As Evans points out:“When it comes to authorising military intervention for human protection purposes, the argument is compelling that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, should be the first port of call. The difficult question – starkly raised by Kosovo – is whether it should be the last.”[47]Evans goes on to note that if for some reason the Security Council is unwilling to grant authority there are two possible means by which an intervening state may obtain the necessary authority. They are:· The matter may be taken to the General Assembly in an Emergency Special Session under the ambit of “Uniting for Peace”, a measure that was successfully used to commence military action in Korea in 1950, as well as in Egypt in 1956 and the Congo in 1960.[48] Such a measure, if taken, could have secured authority to use military action in Rwanda and Kosovo.[49]· Another method for obtaining the right authority to use military force under the auspices of the Responsibility to React would be by virtue of jurisdiction under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, conditional upon obtaining Security Council approval subsequently. This measure was used with respect to West Africa and Liberia in the 1990s and in Sierra Leone in 1997.[50]The ICISS did address the question of reaction in instances where the Security Council does not provide authorization. Essentially the ICISS indicated that in the event the Security Council fails to act itself:· Other states may take the initiative, but may, in the absence of constraints and discipline provided by the UN’s authority, may mean that intervention is for disingenuous purposes, and may be without he appropriate commitment to the cause.[51]· On the other hands, other states may act and do so correctly.[52] Essentially this is the course taken by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with respect to military intervention in Kosovo.[53]In the final analysis, the responsibility to react provides the incentive to adhere to the responsibility to prevent. As will be demonstrated below, the responsibility to rebuild likewise reinforces the responsibilities to prevent and react.The Responsibility to Rebuild The responsibility to rebuild, like the responsibility to react implies that the responsibility to protect obviates the need to follow through once preventative measures fail and reaction is warranted, specifically military action.[54] In contemplating the responsibility to prevent and react, international communities are forced to look ahead to the responsibility to rebuild. As a result, the measures taken to prevent and react will be guided by the cost of rebuilding. The responsibility to rebuild is tantamount to a duty to reconstruct in the aftermath of conflict and includes measure taken for security, justice, reconciliation and development.[55] Like the responsibilities to prevent and to react, the responsibility to rebuild is not altogether a novel requirement. In fact, in its 1998 report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable and Sustainable Development in Africa, the UN’s Secretary-General articulated the reasons for and a description of responsibilities to rebuild.[56] As such, the responsibility to rebuild can be gleaned from the following description:“By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.”[57] The UN Secretary-General went on to assert that past experiences have adequately illustrated that in obtaining “peace in the aftermath of a conflict” typically goes beyond the provision of military aid and diplomacy. It also requires “an integrated peace building effort” so as to respond to those issues and difficulties that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Likewise, rebuilding which is tantamount to peace building will likely require:“…the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, as well as creating conditions for resumed development. Peace building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crises. Rather it aims to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways that are designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.”[58]Specifically, what is required in the aftermath of a conflict was described by the Secretary general. To start with the UN’s Secretary-General noted that societies that are subjected to conflict will typically have “special needs.”[59] It therefore follows, that in order to circumvent a recurrence of the previous conflict and while at the same time building a solid basis for development:“emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Each priority is linked to every other, and success will require a concerted and coordinated effort on all fronts.”[60] In defining and mandating the responsibility to rebuild the ICISS capitalized on the previous statements made by the UN’s Secretary-General. Under Paragraph 5, the ICIS laid out a framework for the responsibility to rebuild and called for post-conflict planning when military intervention is contemplated.[61] The ICISS points out that if military intervention is ultimately resorted to, the responsibility to rebuild is necessary because there is typically a “breakdown or abdication of a state’s own capacity and authority. It therefore follows that the responsibility to rebuild will encapsulate a commitment and a concerted effort to construct peace, promote “good governance and sustainable development.”[62] In order to ensure “sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation”, adequate funds will have to be allocated to the effort as well as “resources and close cooperation with local people.”[63] This will invariably require remaining in the area for an extended period of time after the conflict has come to an end. The ICISS also noted that in previous times and far too frequently, post conflict rebuilding has been “poorly managed.”[64] Similarly:“…the commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying problems that produced the original intervention action.”[65]Military action must be looked upon as merely a part of a broader goal which is to “prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies” arising in the first place.[66] Likewise, military intervention must be viewed as part of a strategy to prevent these conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, spreading, intensifying, persisting and recurring.[67] The responsibility to rebuild comes into play along side the duty to prevent and react by tying the concepts together with the mutual aim of ensuring that:“…the condition that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface.”[68]Surprisingly, the ICISS went on to express the opinion that the best reconciliation efforts are not “necessarily” negotiated at “high level political dialogue tables.[69] Similarly, the most successful reconciliation efforts do not necessarily come about by virtue of “judicial processes”.[70] In fact the ICISS emphatically stated that:“True reconciliation is best generated by ground level reconstruction efforts , when former armed adversaries join hands in rebuilding their community or creating reasonable living and job conditions at new settlements.”[71] In order for the responsibility to rebuild to be effective, peace building will necessarily involve:· The creation of and “strengthening of national institutions”.[72]· Playing close attention to the election process.· Implementing and securing a regiment of human rights.· Making provision for reintegration and rehabilitation processes.· The creation of “conditions for resumed development.”[73]· Cooperation and participation in “other productive activities.”The ICISS identified three core issues that are intricately tied to the responsibility to rebuild. They are security, justice together with reconciliation and Development. The ICISS calls for “basic security” and protection with respect to each individual among the general population.[74] In providing security, the intervening state is cautioned to keep in mind that quite often in the aftermath of a conflict, instances of “revenge killings” as well as “reverse ethnic cleansing” can surface because it is possible for those who were victimized to “attack groups associated with their former oppressors.”[75] In keeping with the responsibility to rebuild, intervening states are advised to plan ahead for such a “contingency.”[76] In other words, the responsibility to rebuild must remain a pivotal part of plans to take on the responsibilities to prevent and react. In this way, each of the triple responsibilities remain a focus when contemplating the appropriate response to human suffering or the risk of human suffering.The ICISS also cautions that in taking security measures it is important to take into account, the fact that “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” of the “local security forces” is among the most problematic tasks in the aftermath of conflict. [77] Until reintegration takes place, the military intervention may not be looked upon as complete.[78] In providing security it is also important to take into account, the fact that law and order is essential to rebuilding. Unless and until a “demobilized soldier” is reintegrated and earning an income, he or she will likely turn to either “armed crime or armed political opposition.”[79] The military will also be required to act as police officers since in many instances, law and order is in disarray. However, once the post-conflict atmosphere tapers out, civilian police office can be introduced. Ultimately, the ICISS stated that:“An essential part of pre-intervention planning has been identified by both political and military personnel as being an exit strategy (not the same thing as an exit timetable) for intervening troops. There is force in the argument that without such a strategy there are serious risks in mounting any military intervention at all, as an unplanned, let alone precipitate, exit could have disastrous, or at best unsettling, implications for the country, and could also serve to discredit even the positive aspects of the intervention itself.”[80] With respect to justice and reconciliation, the ICISS pointed out that in most places where military conflict occurs, there was either no viable judiciary or law enforcement regiment, and if they were, they have been dismantled prior to and/or during the conflict. Both the judiciary and law enforcement are required to be restored as expeditiously as possible if there is going to be any hope for the promotion and protection of human rights.[81] To this end, intervening countries should devise a “standard penal code” which can be applied in “any situation where there is no appropriate existing body of law,” and the application should be implemented at the start of the intervention process so as to ensure that minorities have the protection of the law and the military may be at liberty to take effective action against those who commit crimes.[82] Other matters of concern with respect to rebuilding a justice system and promoting reconciliation are returning refuges and their legal rights. All steps should be taken to ensure that these groups are not subjected to differential treatment. The ICISS noted that in the case of Croatia, discriminatory treatment of members of the populace was prevalent. Those kinds of mistakes cannot be repeated as they are not conducive to the rebuilding process. To this end:“Facilitating returns requires the removal of the administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to return, ending the culture of impunity vis-a-vis known or suspected war criminals and the adoption of non-discriminatory property laws.”[83] Moreover, “return sustainability” remains a concern and is essential for securing the “long-term success of repatriation.”[84] The ICISS explained that the concept of return sustainability refers to the cultivating adequate social and economic environments for those returning. This includes ensuring that there is adequate provisions for education, health and “basic services” and is also connected to overall reformation.[85] The intervening state is likewise required to isolate and remove corruption, promote good governance and secure long-term “economic regeneration of country.[86] Development is described by the ICISS as the “final peace building responsibility” and requires that as far as it is reasonably possible to do so, to foster “economic growth” as well as the “creation of markets and sustainable development.”[87] The ICISS emphasised the significance of fostering economic growth, pointing out that it is intricately tied to law and order. Likewise it has serious implications for the country’s rehabilitation in general. To this end the ICISS pointed out that:“A consistent corollary of this objective must be for the intervening authorities to find a basis as soon as possible to end any coercive economic measures they may have applied to the country before or during the intervention, and not prolong comprehensive or punitive sanctions.”[88] As with the transfer of police powers, intervening countries are also charged with the responsibility to transfer “development responsibilities to “local leadership” without incident as far as it is possible and reasonable to do so.[89] The general idea is to set up a system for development and to manage it as quickly and as efficiently as possible so that it has long-term effect and then to transfer the system to the country in question. This approach is especially significant for the rebuilding obligation because it provides a measure of hope for the populace with respect to their country’s future progress.[90] It is obvious that the ICISS seeks not only to require that intervening states improve the governance and socio-economic conditions of the targeted state, but also seeks to impose upon the intervening state a duty to do so. Wilde maintains that it can be argued that the obligation to rebuild can be interpreted as overly intrusive and reminiscent of colonization.[91] Colonization is largely regarded as racist and discriminatory because it promotes civilization missions based on a purely subjective definition of civilization. It basically permitted the appointed of guardians for people determined to be incapable of self-government.[92] Colonization often invoked elements of prevention, reaction and rebuilding. However the old world colonization was trumped by the doctrine of self-determination.[93] What followed was an era of decolonization and recognition that the decolonized states commanded equal treatment and regard with respect to national sovereignty.[94] Wilde argues that the new concept of the responsibility to protect and the obligation to rebuild closely mirrors the concept of colonization and imperialism. When one looks at the ICISS’s mandate with respect to the duty to rebuild, it encapsulates obligations that can be linked to colonization and imperialism. The duty to develop governance, law and order and economic structures are certainly reminiscent of colonization and imperialism. However, what distinguishes the responsibility to rebuild from colonization are the motives for rebuilding. Colonization involved targeting land and resources for selfish motives. These selfish motives invariably involved the acquisition of foreign land for the purpose of improving homeland economic and political strengths.[95] The responsibility to rebuild, emanates from primarily unselfish motives, although the ICISS maintains that it is entirely impossible to eliminate selfish motives. Be that as it may, the responsibility to rebuild remains an obligation to rebuild a nation whose population has suffered specific inhuman atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Unlike colonization, the idea of rebuilding seeks to remove the cancer that gave way to the scores of human suffering in the context of universal definitions of human dignity and rights. Moreover, the intervening state does not annex the targeted state and is required to leave the state once rebuilding is well on the way. In other words, the targeted state is rebuilt for its population and not for the benefit of the intervening state. If anything, the intervening state has nothing to gain outside of promoting world peace.To this end, the targeted state’s right to self-determination is not usurped. It is the right of the oppressors to oppress and continue to oppress that is compromised by the rebuilding process. Once law and order is restored and the oppressors removed from state, the population’s right to self-determination remains their right.Wilde points out that, there are four important factors that distinguish the responsibility to rebuild from the concepts of colonization and imperialism. First and foremost, the rebuilding process is authorised by international law. Secondly, the polices and practices applicable to the responsibility to rebuild are founded upon recognized principles of international law and as such remain universally viable. Thirdly, the process of rebuilding typically engages the participation of international organization such as the Red Cross and other humanitarian groups, the UN’s organizations rather than individual states and are ultimately humanitarian as opposed to exploitive. Fourthly, the process of rebuilding is a temporary measure.[96] The ICISS does not impose upon international communities a general responsibility to rebuild nations whose population are subjected to or are in imminent danger of being subjected to human atrocities. The duty will only arise in instances where a state intervenes.[97] In this way the decision to intervene requires foresight of consequences in the context of the ensuing responsibility to rebuild. As Day and Freeman maintain, the duty is to the population rather than the state and as a result the idea of sovereignty within the context of the responsibility to rebuild belongs to the population.[98] The underlying goal of the ICISS with respect to the responsibility to protect essentially looks to the root causes of the relevant human suffering. As a result the responsibility to rebuild is significant for eradicating that cause. If the responsibility to react and to prevent were left to stand alone, the internal political and socio-economic weaknesses that gave way to human atrocities will not be eradicated. They will return. Iraq is perhaps a good example of important role the responsibility to rebuild plays within the scope and range of the responsibility to protect. The Iraqi regime under dictator Saddam Husein committed a number of atrocities including genocide against the Kurds in the late 1980s. Crimes against humanity included the chemical bombing of a Halabja, an important culture symbol for the Kurds. Kurds were gassed in an exercise that was called the largest chemical attack on civilians in history. Others were imprisoned and the exact number of deaths remain undocumented. Other crimes against humanity were committed by Iraq in the Iraqi-Iranian War from 1980-1988 when Iraq utilized chemical weapons against Iranian troops. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait from 1990-1991 other crimes continued and included torture, execution and inexplicable disappearances as well as indiscriminate looting of museums and other important Kuwaiti archives.[99] Despite the UN’s Security Council’s demands on August 6, 1990, that Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait, the invasion continued. On August 8, 1990, the US and other Western allies commenced with Operation Dessert Shield against Iraq. By October 17, 1990 there were well over 200,000 Western Troops in Gulf. On 29 November,1990, the UN Security Council announced that if Iraq did not voluntarily withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, then “all necessary means” would be deployed to oust Iraq.[100] Iraq did not adhere to the warning and on January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced with air attacks on both Iraq and Kuwait. Ultimately, the Western efforts were successful and Iraq accepted the UN resolutions on 28 February. [101] Once Kuwait was freed no further action was taken with respect to Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror continued in Iraq.[102]From 1991 to 2003, Hussein, a dictator notorious for crimes against humanity and against his own people, including genocide continued to rule. It was not until 2003, that his rule came to an end when the US and its coalition invaded Iraq.[103] To date the rebuilding process continues. Ultimately, the attack on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 did not include a rebuilding process in Iraq. Although it did prevent and put a stop to war crimes and other crimes against humanity in Kuwait, it did nothing to end the suffering of the Iraqi populace. Had the rebuilding process taken place in 1991, Hussien’s reign of terror might have been truncated and many lives might have been spared in Iraq. The Iraqi experience over the years is an indication that it is tried and true that intervention alone does not isolate the root cause of the problem. Prevention can only be effective if it is coupled with reaction and rebuilding. Rebuilding is only necessary when reaction is effective. It therefore follows that the responsibility to protect is of no practical importance if it is not intricately tied to the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild. Although the ICISS specifically stated that the responsibility to prevent is the most important element within the responsibility to protect, the former cannot be effective unless rebuilding forms a part of the strategy.Conclusion The responsibility to protect pulls the international community together so that multinational cooperation is necessary for compliance with the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild. Each of these arms of the responsibility to protect place an onerous burden on the intervening states, so that the responsibility is far too heavy for one nation to carry alone. To start with, under the responsibility to react, the intervening state, in satisfying the requirement that the intention is not motivated by self-interest is required to obtain agreement or at least approval by other states. Moreover, in dispensing with the need to counter the self-interest bar to the responsibility to react, joining forces with other states tend to indicate that the parties are united for a common cause rather than disparate causes. The duty to rebuild by itself is a cumbersome burden, requiring that the intervening state strategize from the moment of intervention. Moreover, the rebuilding process encapsulates a broad array of obligations that can compromise economic and social stability in the internal mechanisms of the intervening state. While providing funding and training for the rehabilitation of a foreign land, the intervening state is very likely suffering economic difficulties or very near to it as a result of its sending the military to a foreign country. In discharging the responsibility to rebuild and planning for it initially, the intervening state may find it beneficial to secure the aid of other nations before taking action. By mandating that intervening states strategize prior to taking action however, also provides an opportunity for that state to make a checklist of the cost and consequences of failing to prevent human atrocities. With this foresight in mind, the ICISS may have intended that the responsibilities to react and rebuild may never arise. Faced with the costs and consequences of failing to prevent, states may be more vigilant and ensure that human rights atrocities are circumvented from the outset. In this way each of the triple responsibilities under the duty to protect are intricately tied so that the significance of one responsibility is implied by the others.Sovereignty is a privilege that can only be earned and respected in a regime that respects universal understanding of human rights and dignity. By reconstructing the definition of sovereignty in this way, the ICISS has set out to demand international cooperation in instances where an oppressive regime as lost or has failed to earn the right to call themselves a sovereign nation. In this regard sovereignty is measured in terms of the manner in which a state treats its population. If that population is subjected to catastrophic harm, sovereignty is absent. It therefore follows, that in preventing an d reacting to those the atrocities, rebuilding is equally important in the event military intervention is required to prevent and react. The assumption is that the catastrophe would not have occurred if the nation was respectful of human rights and dignity. In which case, neither prevention or reaction and ultimately rebuilding would be necessary. Be that as it may, the emphasis remains on crimes that are serious enough to either cause catastrophic human suffering or to be imminently likely. This requirement acts as a bastion against the chances that a nation can be at risk of losing its right to self-determination and the mask of sovereignty lightly. It is necessary for the UN to draw a line so as to ensure that peace building under the auspices of the responsibility to protect is not interpreted so as to provide an excuse to compromise world peace. To this end responsibility to rebuild is crucial to maintaining barriers to the indiscriminate interpretation of the responsibilities to prevent and react under the responsibility to protect. As previously noted, once the decision is made to implement military action under the auspices the responsibility to protect, the intervening state is required to look ahead and to have a keen foresight of consequences. This is because, whatever action the state resorts to, it will be required to complete the action and completion means leaving the invaded state in a far better position than it was in at the time of the intervention. This is an onerous responsibility and certainly one that will ensure that action will only be taken in circumstances where the intervening state is committed to the cause. The triple responsibilities, taking together, also ensures that the intervening state has the resources to take on the task of preventing, reacting and rebuilding another nation, while sustaining its own nation’s status quo. While this likelihood might shorten the list of potential actors, it might also shorten the list of countries who have no more than a self-interest in the invasion of another state. In the final analysis, the world has become almost entirely connected so that there is no longer individual states, but states connected to one another and co-existing inter-dependently. The dynamics of inter-dependence requires cooperation and assistance and a measure of comity among nations. In promoting a universal discourse on human rights and human dignity, the responsibility to protect is one means of ensuring universal definitions and expectations of human rights and human dignity. The triple responsibilities either individually or collectively ensure function together to ensure that those who are denied those rights can be reassured that those rights will be secured, and in that knowledge can insist upon them. By approaching the responsibility to protect as a peace building mission, it is entirely within the aims and objectives of the UN Charter. Those aims and objectives are calculated to promote peace. Peace starts with the populations. If the abuse of rights and the dignity of populations are prevented, reacted to and those rights are rebuilt by virtue of international cooperation, the UN Charter’s goals and objectives for peace are at the very least likely to be effective.Works CitedAnghie, A. (2005) Imperialiam, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge University Press.Annan, K. (June, 2001) “Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General.” A/55/986-S/2001/574.Arbour, L. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice.” Review of International Studies. 34, 445-485.Barbour, B and Gorlick, B. (2008) “Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims.” International Journal of Refugee Law, 20(4), 553-566.BBC News. (Aug. 2, 2000) “Timeline: War in the Gulf.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm Retrieved March 22, 2009.Belloni, R. (2007) “The Trouble with Humanitarianism.” Review of International Studies. 33, 451-474.Brown, A. (2008) “Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?” Research Paper 08/55, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library.Canadian Council on International Law. (2004) “The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law. Kluwer Law International.Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.(1997) “Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.” Washington, D.C.Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1952.Evans, G. (2004) “The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention.” Addres to the Amercian Society of International Law, 98th Annual Meeting, Panel on Rethinking Collective Action. Washington, D.C.Evans, G. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come…and Gone?” International Relations. 22(3), 283-298.Ferro, M. (1997) Colonization: A Global History. Routledge.Forsythe, D. (2003) “Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society by Nicholas J. Wheeler.” Perspectives on Politics. 1(1) 244-245.Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. (2002) “Introduction: Making Conflict Prevention a Priority,” Cited Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. (eds) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre.Luck, E. (August 2008) “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect.” Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation.Luck, E. (2008) “The Responsible Soveriegn and the Responsibility to Protect.” Cited in Muller, J. and Sauvant, P. (eds) Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. Oxford University Press.McClean, E. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13(1), 123-152.Mertus, J. and Helsing, J. (2006) Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding. US Institute of Peace Press.Newton, M. and Scharf, P.(2008) Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein. St. Martin’s Press.Ramsbotham, O.; Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2006) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Oxford: Polity.Thakur, R. (2002) “Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experience from ICISS.” Security Dialogue. 33(2), 323-340.UN Charter.UN General Assembly. (Sept. 1955) “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” General Assembly, A/2911.UN Secretary-General. (April, 1998) “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development In Africa. Report of the UN Secretary-General.UN Security Council Resolution 1366, August 30th, 2001.Welsh, J.; Thielaking, C. and MacFarlance, N. (2002) “The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Iintervention and State Sovereignty.” International Journal, 57(4), 489-512.Wilde, R. (2008) International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away. Oxford University Press.[1] McClean, E. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13(1), 123-152.[2] Arbour, L. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice.” Review of International Studies. 34, 445-485.[3] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre.[4] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), see n.3.[5] Welsh, J.; Thielaking, C. and MacFarlance, N. (2002) “The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Iintervention and State Sovereignty.” International Journal, 57(4), 489-512.[6] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), see n.3.[7] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), 11, see n.3.[8] Barbour, B and Gorlick, B. (2008) “Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims.” International Journal of Refugee Law, 20(4), 553-566.[9] Barbour and Gorlick, (2008).[10] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), 17, see n.3.[11] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), see n.3.[12] Mertus, J. and Helsing, J. (2006) Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding. US Institute of Peace Press, 55.[13] UN Charter, Preamble.[14] UN General Assembly. (Sept. 1955) “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” General Assembly, A/2911.[15] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.(1997) “Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.” Washington, D.C.[16] Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. (2002) “Introduction: Making Conflict Prevention a Priority,” Cited Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. (eds) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 4.[17] Ramsbotham, O.; Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2006) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Oxford: Polity, 124.[18] Annan, K. (June, 2001) “Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General.” A/55/986-S/2001/574.[19] UN Security Council Resolution 1366, August 30th, 2001.[20] Luck, E. (August 2008) “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect.” Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, 4.[21] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1952, Art. 1.[22] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 3, see N. 21.[23] Luck (August 2008) 4, see N. 20.[24] Luck (August 2008) 4, see N. 20.[25] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre, Para. (4)A.[26] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001)Para (4)B.[27] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001)20.[28] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre, 23.[29] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), 27 see N. 28.[30] Luck, E. (2008) “The Responsible Soveriegn and the Responsibility to Protect.” Cited in Muller, J. and Sauvant, P. (eds) Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. Oxford University Press.[31] Luck, E. (2008) “The Responsible Soveriegn and the Responsibility to Protect.” See N. 30.[32] Brown, A. (2008) “Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?” Research Paper 08/55, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library.[33] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre.[34] Weiss, T. (2006) “R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit.” Wisconsin International Law Journal. 24(3)[35] Evans, G. (2004) “The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention.” Addres to the Amercian Society of International Law, 98th Annual Meeting, Panel on Rethinking Collective Action. Washington, D.C.[36] Evans, G. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come…and Gone?” International Relations. 22(3), 283-298.[37] Evans, (2008) 283-298, see N. 36.[38] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[39] Belloni, R. (2007) “The Trouble with Humanitarianism.” Review of International Studies. 33, 451-474.[40] Forsythe, D. (2003) “Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society by Nicholas J. Wheeler.” Perspectives on Politics. 1(1) 244-245.[41] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[42] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[43] Thakur, R. (2002) “Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experience from ICISS.” Security Dialogue. 33(2), 323-340.[44]Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[45] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[46] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[47] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[48] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[49] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[50] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[51] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: ”International Development and Research Centre.[52] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001)[53] Evans, (2008) 283-298., see N. 36.[54] Canadian Council on International Law. (2004) “The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law. Kluwer Law International, 98.[55] Canadian Council on International Law. (2004), 98.[56] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre.[57] UN Secretary-General. (April, 1998) “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development In Africa. Report of the UN Secretary-General.[58] UN Secretary-General. (April, 1998) see N. 56.[59] UN Secretary-General. (April, 1998) see N. 56.[60] UN Secretary-General. (April, 1998) see N. 56.[61] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[62] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[63] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[64] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[65] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[66] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[67] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[68] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[69] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[70] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[71] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[72] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[73] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[74] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[75] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[76] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[77] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[78] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[79] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[80] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[81]International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[82] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[83] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[84] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[85] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[86] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[87] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001) “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ont., Ca.: International Development and Research Centre, Para 5.[88] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[89] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[90] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Dec. 2001), Para 5 See N. 62.[91] Wilde, R. (2008) International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away. Oxford University Press.[92] Wilde (2008) See N. 91.[93] Anghie, A. (2005) Imperialiam, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 109.[94]Wilde (2008) See N. 91.[95] Ferro, M. (1997) Colonization: A Global History. Routledge, 1.[96] Wilde, R. (2008) International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away. Oxford University Press.[97] Day, Graham and Freeman, C. (2003) “From Policekeeping to Peace: Intervention, Transitional Administration and the Responsibility to Do it Right.” Working Paper.[98] Day and Freeman (2003) See N. 97.[99] Newton, M. and Scharf, P.(2008) Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein. St. Martin’s Press.[100] BBC News. (Aug. 2, 2000) “Timeline: War in the Gulf.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm Retrieved March 22, 2009.[101] BBC News. (Aug. 2, 2000) See N. 100.[102] Newton and Scharf (2008)see N. 99.[103] Newton and Scharf (2008)see N. 99.
